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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











BRICKLAYERS & ALLIED CRAFTWORKERS LOCAL 4 PENSION PLAN AND 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE BRICKLAYERS & 
ALLIED CRAFT WORKERS LOCAL 4 PENSION PLAN 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-02065) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 8, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 






AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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This case stems from a dispute between Angela Fiorentino, a clerical employee of 
the Health Fund of the New Jersey Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Union (“BAC”), 
and the BAC Local 4 Pension Plan (the “Pension Plan” or “Plan”) along with the Pension 
Plan’s Board of Trustees (the “Trustees”).  After the Trustees established the Pension 
Plan under a trust agreement,1 all local BAC union health funds in New Jersey were 
consolidated into what is now called the Health Fund.  The agreement that caused the 
consolidation was distinct from the Pension Plan’s trust agreement, and the Health Fund 
did not sign the Plan’s Trust Agreement.  In 1996, the Health Fund hired Gary 
Mercadante as its administrator.  It is undisputed that, by June 2006 at the latest, 
Mercadante was responsible for administering funds for the Pension Plan. 
In 1997, Fiorentino interviewed with Mercadante for a position at the Health Fund, 
and it subsequently hired her as a clerical office worker.  Fiorentino contends Mercadante 
affirmed that, as an employee of the Health Fund, she would participate in the Pension 
Plan, the Annuity Fund, and the International Fund.  In conflicting testimony, Mercadante 
states that he informed her at the interview that her compensation package would not 
include participation in the Pension Plan.  It is undisputed that, in approximately 1998, 
Fiorentino had a “first year review” meeting with Mercadante at which he informed her 
she would be uncovered by that Plan. 
During her employment after 1999, Fiorentino received annual statements 
confirming the Health Fund’s contributions to the Annuity Fund and the International 
                                              
1 The Pension Plan was a multiemployer plan under Section 3(37) of ERISA (the 
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act).  29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(37).  
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Fund on her behalf.  She did not receive a statement concerning the Pension Plan.  It is 
also undisputed that the Health Fund never submitted remittance forms to the Pension 
Plan for Fiorentino and that no contributions were ever made by the Health Fund to the 
Pension Plan on her behalf.  
Fiorentino was employed by the Health Fund from sometime in 1997 until she 
retired in June of 2014.  Throughout her employment, she qualified as a “non-bargaining” 
(non-union) employee and did not pay Union dues.  About a month after she retired, 
Fiorentino, through counsel, requested an application for benefits from the Pension Plan.  
Just shy of a month later—in August 2014—the Pension Plan denied this request when 
Mercadante, in his capacity as Pension Plan fund administrator, sent her a letter stating 
that she was not a Plan participant.  
Fiorentino then filed in March 2015 the suit before us. In her two-count complaint, 
she alleged that she was entitled to pension benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and 
that defendants had breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA.  The Pension Plan and 
the Trustees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Fiorentino was legally 
incapable of having been a Plan participant and, in the alternative, that the statute of 
limitations for her claims had run.  Fiorentino then filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment on the merits of her claim.  Since we agree that Fiorentino’s ERISA claims are 
time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, we affirm.2  
                                              
2 The District Court rejected Appellees’ alternative theory on summary judgment: 
that § 302 of the Taft Hartley Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)-(c), rendered Fiorentino 
unable to participate in the Plan because it bars an employer from paying or lending 
money to employees, representatives, or unions on behalf of employees absent a written 
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In Count I of her complaint, Fiorentino claimed ERISA entitled her to benefits 
from the Pension Plan.  Because there is no federally prescribed statute of limitations for 
non-fiduciary claims under ERISA § 502, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B), courts apply the 
“limitations period applicable to the forum state claim most analogous to the ERISA 
claim at hand.”  Romero v. Allstate Corp, 404 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The six-year statute of limitations applicable to state-
contract claims applies to claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) in the 
District of New Jersey.  See Starr v. JCI Data Processing, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 633, 638 (D. 
N.J. 1991). 
                                                                                                                                                  
agreement detailing the basis for those payments.  The Court ruled that the Health Fund 
did not qualify as an employer under § 302’s provisions.  It reasoned that the overriding 
congressional intent in enacting the provision was to protect the collective bargaining 
process from corruption by prohibiting collective-bargaining employers from making 
payments to the union with whom they bargained.  Because the Health Fund did not 
engage in collective bargaining with the Pension Plan union concerning the Health 
Fund’s employees, it fell outside the statute’s reach.  
The Court also rejected Fiorentino’s claim that the text of the Pension Plan entitled 
her to benefits as a Plan participant as a matter of law, where neither she nor her 
employer had signed the agreement.  
While the Court’s dismissal of these cross-motions for summary judgment left 
Fiorentino’s status as a “participant” unresolved—and she must be a participant to have 
standing under the statute to sue—it had jurisdiction to proceed to consider the argument 
that the applicable statutes of limitations barred Fiorentino’s claims.  See Leyse v. Bank of 
Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 & n.4 (2014) (“Unlike Article III 
standing, statutory standing is not jurisdictional. Statutory standing goes to whether 
Congress has accorded a particular plaintiff the right to sue under a statute, but it does not 
limit the power of the court to adjudicate the case.”).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s entry of summary 
judgment, “construing all evidence and resolving all doubts raised by affidavits, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file in favor of the non-moving 
party.”   Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 465, 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
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“[T]he accrual date for federal claims is governed by federal law, irrespective of 
the source of the limitations period.”  Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 516, 520 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Because there is no controlling federal statute on accrual governing this 
claim, we apply the federal discovery rule.  Id.  Per this rule, a claim begins to accrue 
when a plaintiff “discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that 
forms the basis for the claim.”  Romero, 404 F.3d at 222.  “In the ERISA context, the 
discovery rule has been ‘developed’ into the more specific ‘clear repudiation’ rule 
whereby a non-fiduciary cause of action accrues when a claim for benefits has been 
denied.”  Miller, 475 F.3d at 520.  The clear repudiation rule does not require formal 
denial: a claim will qualify as denied where “there has already been a repudiation of the 
benefits by the fiduciary which was clear and made known to the beneficiary.’” Id. at 
520-21 (emphasis in original); see also Romero, 404 F.3d at 220–23.   
Here we conclude that there was a repudiation that was clear and made known to 
the beneficiary.  This occurs when there is conduct by the fiduciary that is “adverse to the 
beneficiary.”  Miller, 475 F.3d at 521.  An adverse-benefit determination includes “a 
denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make payment (in whole or 
in part) for, a benefit.”  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(m)(4); see also Miller, 475 F.3d at 521.  
Fiorentino concedes that after Mercadante became a fiduciary of the Pension Plan, 
sometime between 2006 and 2007, he informed her that she was not a participant.  This 
representation was adverse to Fiorentino and therefore repudiated her rights under the 
Plan. 
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Our Court has further anchored the limitations period to a plaintiff’s reasonable 
discovery of actual harm and has required that putative participants and beneficiaries 
“exercise reasonable diligence” in investigating and preserving their ERISA benefits.  Id. 
at 522.  Based on the evidence before us, the District Court properly determined that 
Fiorentino failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the face of the Pension Plan’s clear 
repudiation of her rights.  Once she learned she was not considered eligible for benefits—
a fact she discovered no later than 1998—she complained at her yearly meetings to 
Mercadante.  Each year he informed her that she was not a Plan participant.  He 
continued to inform her of this after he also became a fiduciary of the Pension Plan, 
which occurred in June of 2006 at the latest.  In addition, Fiorentino knew at least in 1998 
that the Health Fund was not making contributions to the Pension Plan on her behalf.  
Moreover, she never received any contribution statements from the Pension Fund, while 
she received annual statements from the two union benefit funds in which she was 
enrolled—the Annuity Fund and the International Fund.  
Because Mercadante’s repudiation as a fiduciary was clear and made known to 
Fiorentino at the latest on December 31, 2007, her claim began to accrue no later than 
that date, and she lost her right to bring the claim six years later on December 31, 2013.  
Because she did not file the current suit until March 23, 2015, her claim for benefits is 
untimely.  
In the second count of her complaint, Fiorentino alleges that the plan administrator 
breached his fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) by failing to collect 
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contributions from the Health Fund on her behalf, failing to allow her to make a claim for 
benefits under the Pension Plan, and failing to provide her with benefits under the Plan. 
Under ERISA, the statute of limitations for breach of a fiduciary duty is the earlier 
of:  
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of the 
breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the latest date on which the 
fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or  
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge 
of the breach or violation. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1113(2).  “By its terms then, ERISA’s statute of limitations provision offers a 
choice of periods, depending on ‘whether the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the 
breach[.]”   Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 511 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
A finding of actual knowledge requires proof of “knowledge of all relevant facts at 
least sufficient to give the plaintiff knowledge that a fiduciary duty has been breached or 
ERISA provision violated.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   Our 
review of the record affirms the District Court’s conclusion that Fiorentino had actual 
knowledge of the alleged breaches — failure to collect contributions from the Health 
Fund, failure to allow her to make a claim for benefits under the Pension Plan, and failure 
to provide her with benefits under it — by the date of the clear repudiation.  See Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that “all the material 
elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim were patently obvious” where defendant 
“openly announced that certain employees would receive better benefits, and others 
would not”).  Because Fiorentino had actual knowledge of the alleged breach on 
December 31, 2007, at the latest, then, per 28 § U.S.C. 1113(2), December 31, 2010 
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would be the latest possible date to pursue her claim.  Waiting to file suit until 2015 thus 
falls outside the permissible statutory range, and it too is untimely. 
Nor do we find that Fiorentino’s case merits equitable tolling of these time-limits.  
A beneficiary can make out a claim for equitable relief based on a theory of equitable 
estoppel.  “To succeed [], an ERISA plaintiff must establish (1) a material representation, 
(2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, and (3) extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Inc., 539 F.3d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We agree with the District Court 
that there is nothing in the record to indicate extraordinary circumstances that prevented 
Fiorentino from bringing her claim within the applicable statutory period.  The record 
establishes that she was aware in 1998 that neither the Health Fund nor the Pension Plan 
considered her a participant in the latter.  Minimal diligence would have alerted her to a 
possible cause of action such that she could have pursued a claim in a timely manner.  
Instead, she took no action to request the Plan to compel her employer, the Health Fund, 
to make contributions on her behalf, and thus her case does not merit equitable tolling.  
* * * * *  
 We affirm in all respects the judgment of the District Court.  
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